Gaps in the welfare State and reforms to pension systems in Latin America by Uthoff, Andras
9C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 9  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 6
GAPS IN THE WELFARE STATE AND REFORMS TO PENSION SYSTEMS IN LATIN AMERICA  •  ANDRAS UTHOFF
Andras Uthoff
Officer in Charge,
Social Development Division of ECLAC
2 andras.uthoff@cepal.org
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 9  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 6





Pension systems in Latin America are organized as tripartite
contributory schemes paid into by employers, employees and the State.
Their coverage has always been segmented and very low because a
significant percentage of the labour market is composed of subsistence
sectors with low productivity and unstable, uncertain access to
commercial and financial networks (associated with a lack of employment
protections, low income levels and a high incidence of poverty). As a
result, contributory systems exclude a large proportion of workers and
their families from protection against the risks of disability, old age and
death, with large differences in coverage between the formal and informal
sectors. The main challenge now is to incorporate solidarity financing
into pension systems in an efficient way, so that contributory and non-
contributory schemes can be combined in accordance with the logic of
social security.
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I
Introduction
Pension systems have been designed with a view to
smoothing fluctuations in consumption over the life
cycle and ensuring decent incomes in situations of old
age, disability and death. Their functions are social in
nature, as they aim to remedy short-sighted decision-
making about saving for old age and to use solidarity
financing to provide the elderly poor with income.
Nowadays, emphasis is also placed on their potential
economic functions, such as contributing to the solvency
of the public finances, providing financial savings for
capital market development and making labour more
competitive by reducing employment costs.
The development of these systems has been based
on two assumptions: (i) workers are fully employed
and in a position to save throughout their active life
cycle, and (ii) families have one main provider whose
insurance protects the other members. With these
premises, systems combine contributory instruments
(saving and insurance) to finance benefits in the event
of unforeseen losses of income resulting from
disablement and premature death, and to ensure a
decent old age (life expectancy). Contributions have
traditionally been tripartite, being made by workers,
employers and the State, and their purpose has been to
protect the workers themselves, in their capacity as
main earners, and their families. In some countries there
are non-contributory pensions for poor older adults,
and these are financed out of general taxation.
This article places the debate about pension system
reforms in the context of the region’s main
characteristics,  then goes on to examine the
implications these characteristics have for the
assumptions by which pension systems work. In the
light of these considerations, it analyses the validity
of the reform options chosen, highlights the main
results observed in the region and formulates some
conclusions about the importance of the role to be
played in solving the pensions issue by the ECLAC
proposal for the development of a social cohesion
covenant to give the fiscal covenant a human face.
II
The main characteristics of the region
The extent to which the structural characteristics of
the Latin American and Caribbean countries have been
overlooked is striking, since knowledge of these has
proved essential for evaluating pension system
performance, almost irrespective of the type of reform
carried out. Here I would like to highlight just five of
these characteristics. First, the region’s average
development level: its per capita gross domestic
product (GDP) averages a little over US$ 5,000, which
places it well above developing regions in Africa and
Asia, but is only a fifth of the average for the group of
developed countries in the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) (figure 1). The
main effect of this characteristic is that, in the new
globalization paradigm, Latin America and the
Caribbean have been treated as a middle-income region
capable of attracting international capital to meet its
development needs and of entering into free trade
agreements to sell its products on international markets.
Actually, though, far from consolidating stable access
to these markets, international capital flows have been
elusive for some countries and volatile for others, and
trade continues to be constrained by protectionism and
unstable commodity prices. The fact is that the region’s
countries have seen their external vulnerability
increase, have experienced severe trade and financing
crises, and have had to weather major financial and
balance-of-payments crises, with enormous social costs
in the adjustment phases.
Second, the region has a history of inequality.
Measured by the Gini coefficient, in fact, it is the
world’s most unequal. What this chiefly means is that,
at current development levels, large sections of the
population have been left in poverty and indigence
and that, with inequality patterns like these, higher
growth rates are required to defeat poverty (ECLAC ,
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2005a)–and these higher rates have not been
forthcoming in the region in any stable fashion for
decades.
Third, some indicators produced by ECLAC suggest
that the region’s economies have largely implemented
the recommendations of international financial
institutions concerning the introduction of structural
reforms to liberalize the economy and give a larger
role to the market and the private sector in the allocation
of resources (figure 2). This has exposed major
shortcomings in market regulation and oversight in
the new industries that have grown up around public
services and social policy management.
Fourth, it is important to note that while the
proposed reforms to limit the role of the State to that of
regulator, supervisor and distributor prevent it from
managing enterprises,1  they do not release it from its
responsibility for designing and implementing
mechanisms to protect the rights of the poorest,
especially against health risks and employment and
pension problems. In particular, it has to protect them
against the structural risk represented by the mechanisms
that transfer poverty across the generations, i.e., against
exclusion from opportunities (in terms of nutrition, food,
housing and decent work), which is largely a result of
the poverty into which many of its citizens are born.
With the development issues that concern us, a paradox
arises: the less developed a country is, the greater the
needs are, but the lower the tax take from which
governments can finance this goal. As figure 3 shows,
public spending in Latin America as a percentage of
GDP rose from 15% to 25% between the 1970s and 1980s,
but then fell back to around 20%. This is less than half
the equivalent figure in the countries of the European
Union, where the welfare State is sizeable. Since the
level of development in the European Union as
expressed in per capita GDP is five times that of Latin
America, it follows that public spending per person in
the European Union is ten times Latin America’s.
Lastly, we cannot ignore the risks entailed by
globalization, which create a new dilemma for social
protection systems. Because Latin America has come
to be seen as a middle-income region, the countries
have had to look to international markets for
development financing sources and outlets for their
export products. Thus, these economies have become
more vulnerable to changes in international markets,
and this, in the absence of an international financial
architecture to coordinate macroeconomies and ensure
stability, has made them far more sensitive to
international crises. From the point of view of social
protection, it is important to recognize that the regional
economy has become more volatile and uncertain and
that the adjustment measures applied to cope with
financial crises entailing major social costs have been
procyclical and placed extra pressure on the labour
market, increasing problems of underemployment and
1 Although many countries have kept the management of
strategic enterprises in the public sector (for example, copper
companies in Chile and oil companies in Mexico and the
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FIGURE 2
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the project “Growth, employment and equity: Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s” (HOL/97/6034),
with data to 1995 from Morley, Machado and Pettinato (1999).
FIGURE 3
International comparisons: Public spending, 1970-2005a
(Percentages of GDP)
Source: For Latin America, ECLAC data based on official information; for European Union countries, Japan and the United States,
data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
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unemployment and forcing the State to cut spending
just when the need for it is greatest.
In summary, social protection in Latin America
needs to improve in the context of societies that, on
the one hand, are considered “mature” and that, within
the paradigm of globalization, are having to pursue
their development in an ever more unstable world and
subject their economies to increasing liberalization,
reducing the role of the State. Yet, on the other hand,
these societies have a history of inequality between
their citizens, and of low growth and investment crises
as well, so that their governments lack the instruments
needed to solve long-standing problems of inequality
in the midst of growth and employment crises.
III
The consequences for social protection
The characteristics of the region have at least four
implications for the development of new social
protection systems. These are: (i) the gap that opens
up in the welfare State when the dynamics of the
population, the labour market and the public finances
are combined; (ii) the new cultural phenomena deriving
from the survival strategies that families have had to
adopt to cope with this situation; (iii) the region’s
growing divergence from the most developed countries
in recent decades; and (iv) lastly, the belief that the
fight against poverty is not succeeding as intended.
Although the region as a whole is in a phase of full
demographic transition, the population dynamic varies
between different groups of countries. Thus, a group
consisting of Bolivia and Haiti is at an incipient stage,
with fertility rates that are still high and a growing
youth population as compared to that of working age.
A second group, composed of El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay, is in a moderate
phase of the demographic transition; there has been a
sharp drop in fertility and the young population is
starting to decline in relation to the working-age
population, but the proportion of elderly people is still
low. A third group of countries, consisting of Brazil,
Ecuador, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Dominican
Republic, is in full demographic transition; lower
fertility was consolidated some years ago, and not only
is the young population still decreasing in relation to
the working-age population, but the elderly population
is beginning to rise as well. Lastly, a fourth group of
countries is at an advanced stage of the demographic
transition, has consolidated the drop in fertility,
continues to show substantial progress in reducing
mortality and is seeing a significant increase in the
proportion of elderly people in relation to those of
working age.
Although this indicator is traditionally used to
measure demographic dependency and anticipate
possible shortfalls in the solvency of unfunded pension
financing systems, it involves an assumption that the
working-age population is able and willing to find
productive, competitive and/or decent work. However,
the data for Latin America reveal three facts which show
that this is far from being the case. First, a large
percentage of people of working age remain inactive,
either because it is difficult to participate in the labour
market while also looking after the home or because
the market does not adequately price in their
opportunity costs. Second, of those who are willing to
work, the proportion failing to find jobs and remaining
unemployed has risen from 7% to 10%, so that one in
ten is now jobless. Lastly, estimates by the International
Labour Organization (ILO) and ECLAC indicate that six
to seven of every ten new jobs in recent years have
been created in the informal sector, so that the
proportion of working people employed in this segment
of the labour market has increased (figures 4 and 5).
1. The gap in the welfare State
To characterize the gap in the welfare State, it is
essential to have an understanding of changes in the
demographic dynamic, the labour market and public
finances.
In an earlier article (Uthoff, Vera and Ruedi, 2006),
national panel data2  for 1997 and 2002 were used to
examine the behaviour of a dependency indicator
defined as the ratio of minors, non-active adults, adults
2 Urban data were used for Argentina and Uruguay, as this was
what was available, but the bulk of those countries’ population
is urban in any case. Details of how the curve was derived can
be found in Uthoff, Vera and Ruedi (2006).
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FIGURE 4
Latin America: Open unemployment, ages 15 to 64

















Source: International Labour Organization (ECLAC, 2005b).
FIGURE 5
Latin America: Structure of non-agricultural employment
(Percentages)
Source: International Labour Organization (ILO, 2005).
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with informal jobs, unemployed people and older adults
to formal workers. The regression yielded a negative
coefficient of -2.65% for the ratio between the formal
dependency indicator and per capita GDP.3  This ratio
systematically represents the demand for social
protection.
Countries with high dependency indices and low
per capita incomes have a high demand for social
protection, which has to be met from public or private
transfers. Lesser requirements are faced by richer
countries.
A potential supply curve for State-provided social
services can be derived by linking the countries’ per
capita GDP to the number of dependent people in
relation to the number of people in formal work that
could be “protected” by them. For this, we assume that
3 The estimation of the regression on the basis of panel data can
be obtained on request from the authors cited, as can the
Hausman test on the applicability of the random effects model.
The same coefficient would be yielded by an estimation using
pooled data. The 2002 per capita GDP data are taken from the
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the State is capable of providing each dependent with
a given amount of benefits (the same for all categories
of dependents) whose sum equals the total amount of
resources spent on social services in Latin America.4
By including both curves in figure 3, it is possible
to illustrate the gap in the welfare State and thereby
create a typology of countries.5
While the existence of a welfare gap justifies
system models that seek supplementary private
financing, it does not remove the State’s responsibility
for protecting those who reach old age without having
been able to finance their own pension benefits. The
main weakness of the recent reforms has been their
over-reliance on contributory systems, their high cost,
and their effect in depriving the State of resources for
alleviating old-age poverty.
2. Two new cultural phenomena
The higher the overall level of development as
measured by per capita GDP (figure 6), the smaller the
gap between the overall social protection needs of
dependents and the ability of the State to meet them.
These social protection needs can be covered by the
rest of the economy to a degree that depends on the
income situation and people’s capacity for out-of-
pocket expenditure. In cases where public-sector social
protection combined with private spending is
inadequate, the resulting gap will be manifested in poor
social indicators; by bringing about an unsatisfactory
social situation, this shortfall has led to major changes
in family structures (Arriagada, 2005) and in substantial
remittance movements resulting from migration, which
are estimated to have helped mitigate poverty in
thousands of households in the region (figures 7 and 8).
3. Latin America is not converging
The third characteristic of the region is that the last
decade has not been one of high, stable growth. On the
contrary, as ECLAC reported to the International
Conference on Financing for Development, opening
the region up to international trade and financial
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4 Average social spending in Latin America was calculated from
a sample of 16 countries.
FIGURE 6
Latin America: Social protection needs and capacity,
selected countries
5 The b  used in this case is 0.35.
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in unstable and, on average, low growth. In particular,
access to international financial markets was
segmented and highly volatile, export markets
continued with protectionist practices, and growth
ultimately proved sensitive to international financial
crises. The international financial architecture,
meanwhile, was unable to prevent contagion in the
region.
The outcome is reflected in the trend of per capita
GDP. With very few exceptions, per capita GDP in the
region’s countries was higher as a share of United States
GDP in 1993 than in 2003, as the new millennium
began. Going by this very preliminary indicator of
development, the region did not converge towards
United States levels of development (figure 9).
What makes the situation even worse is that, what
with the high levels of inequality within Latin America,
low growth, the effect of debt crises and the incidence
of poverty (40% of the population), it can be concluded
that the region’s inhabitants are still living in much
the same way as those of heavily indebted poor
countries, such as Nicaragua. In short, the region has a
high level of exclusion (figure 10).
FIGURE 8
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Latin America: Indicator of convergence and exclusion, 1993-2003
(Per capita GDP as a percentage of the United States’ )
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of national accounts.
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Latin America: Population that would qualify
for assistance under different categories of
the HIPC initiativea
(Percentages of the population)
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official information; Machinea
and Uthoff (2005, p. 41).






4. Anti-poverty efforts are not succeeding
A fourth characteristic of the region is that, with
development occurring only slowly during the 1990s,
the limitations of the welfare State and of the most
vulnerable households’ survival strategies have
prevented anti-poverty efforts from having any
significant success. Indeed, while it is estimated that
remittances have helped to reduce the incidence of
poverty in recipient households and that State transfers
have also helped to alleviate it, the effect of these
transfers on the incidence of poverty has ultimately
been much smaller than that observed in developed
countries, and poverty levels are still not back down
to the levels seen in years prior to the debt crisis (figures
11 and 12).
For the region as a whole, in fact, the incidence of
poverty displayed a ratchet effect at one stage, since
poverty-output elasticity was much greater in the
recessionary phase than in the subsequent GDP recovery
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)
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phase during the 1990s. Although this effect
disappeared with the most recent crises, it left the
incidence of poverty at a level much higher than that
of 1980, even though the region’s per capita GDP was
almost 12% higher (figure 13).
What emerges from the above is that the life cycle
theory on which pension systems are based needs to be
questioned in the region, since this theory relies on the
supposition that all workers ought to be saving during
the active phase of their life cycle and then dissaving
during the phase of retirement in old age (figure 14).
Doubt is cast over this supposition by at least three
factors: (i) a high proportion of the population live in
poverty with unstable, insecure jobs, many immediate
needs and a high discount rate that limits their long-term
saving capacity; (ii) a growing proportion of women are
having to head single-parent households or supplement
their husband’s income in order to subsist, thus breaking
with the formula whereby the man is the provider and the
woman looks after the house, but without doing away
with the duality of roles in this latter task, so that it is
harder for women to hold down stable employment; and
FIGURE 11
Latin America (11 countries): Impact of remittances on poverty and indigence
rates in recipient households, around 2002a


















































































































































































United Australia Canada United Germany Holland Sweden
States Kingdom
Brazil Mexico Uruguay Chile Colombia Costa Argentina
Rica
FIGURE 12



















Source: For Latin America, prepared by the author using data from the household surveys available (in Uthoff and Ruedi, 2005).
For the OECD countries, Smeeding and Ross (2001).
Source: ECLAC (2005c).
a
 Urban areas only in Uruguay and Ecuador
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(iii) a growing proportion of workers are finding sporadic
employment and do not have the income stability assumed
by the life cycle theory.
In short, as figure 15 illustrates for the case of Chile,
contributory models tend to display a low density of
contributions, reflecting both the desire or need to remain
inactive in order to take care of the home and the
incidence of joblessness, uncertain employment and low
incomes; all this means that participation in contributory
systems reproduces the inequities of the labour market
and of society as a whole. As a result, only those who are
able to find stable, well-paid employment will ultimately
receive decent benefits. Since the great majority are not
in that situation, these standard models will leave a large
proportion of the population without decent pensions,
especially women and those on low incomes.
FIGURE 13
Latin America: Incidence of poverty and
gross domestic product per inhabitant






























over the life cycle
Source: Prepared by the author.
FIGURE 15
Chile: Members paying into the pension system,
by sex, age and poverty statusa
Source: Special tabulations based on the National Socio-economic Survey (CASEN, 1998).
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IV
Pension system reforms
The design of pension systems and the reforms made
to them have tended to overlook the social and
distributive component that is required if a financing
system is to meet the needs of the elderly poor. Instead,
the focus has been on the contributory component,
which has also been required to perform economic
functions such as buttressing the solvency of the public
sector, generating financial saving and assisting the
development of the capital market, while also reducing
costs in order to make labour more competitive.
The financial mechanism traditionally used to
manage contributions and turn them into benefits has
been a pay-as-you-go system based on graded average
premiums, including rules to establish an intergenerational
saving contract and a fund to cover likely risks of
disablement and death, plus reserves for anticipated
demographic changes. Non-contributory pension
systems, where they exist, are financed out of general
taxation and transfers (Mesa Lago, 2004 and 2000).
Unfunded systems have been criticized for a
number of reasons, among them: (i) the administration
of saving funds for events that are certain, such as old
age, differs significantly from that of insurance funds
for likely events (sickness, disablement and premature
death); (ii) financing by intergenerational distribution
cannot cope with significant demographic changes like
those accompanying the rapid ageing of the Latin
American population;6  (iii) these funds are clearly
vulnerable to “political use” of their resources, since
there has always been the possibility that governments
might borrow from them for laudable public policy
financing purposes, but without always ensuring the
risk-return balance required to protect the reserve funds
established to cover long-term benefit payments;
(iv) the nature of system contributions and their
relationship to benefits create scope for large cross-
subsidies that lack transparency, do not always serve
the interests of solidarity, and can affect the solvency
of the system.
These four weaknesses of unfunded systems are at
the heart of the arguments used by international
financial institutions7  to urge the need for structural
reforms, as opposed to traditional parametric reforms
designed to introduce the actuarial adjustments that
system solvency requires. Inspired by the neoliberal
pension model developed under the military regime in
Chile, these institutions promoted structural reforms
whose aim was to establish a strict connection between
individual effort and benefits by turning contributions
into saving deposit instalments kept in individual
retirement accounts under the control of pension fund
management companies (AFPs) which manage
investments in accordance with the rules laid down by
a supervisory body. Unlike the intergenerational
contract, whereby the contributions of current workers
financed the benefits of current retirees, the neoliberal
model introduces an individual contract in which the
worker’s pension is financed out of the “pot” which he
or she succeeds in building up, namely the sum of
lifetime contributions, duly capitalized; in this case, it
is the actual worker who bears the risks of demographic
change, in the form of higher life expectancy at
retirement, and the financial risks of capitalization over
his or her lifetime.
Not all the countries have made reforms of this
type, however. Three types of reform can currently be
distinguished: (i) parametric reforms, with notional
defined-contribution models to the fore; (ii) structural
reforms; and (iii) reforms that supplement current
systems with additional saving mechanisms.
By strengthening the link between a member’s
contributions and benefits, even going so far in the
extreme case as to employ a financing mechanism
whereby these are managed in individual saving
accounts, systems have experienced all the
consequences warned of in the previous section: the
pension fund markets that developed have proved hard
to regulate, and the solutions adopted have tended to
reproduce inequalities instead of counteracting them.
6 These are due to the rapid demographic transition which,
since the mid-1960s, has translated into a large decline in
fertility. Along with gradually rising life expectancy, the drop
in fertility has led to significant changes in the age structure of
the population that are affecting the ability of unfunded systems
to maintain a proper financial balance between contributors
and beneficiaries. 7 See World Bank (1994).
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1. Structural reform options
The design of pension systems in Latin America was
heavily influenced by the “social insurance” developed
in former times by Chancellor Bismarck in Germany,
which established protection for workers against the risks
of old age, disablement and sickness.8  The most striking
feature of such systems as applied in Latin America has
always been their low coverage, chiefly owing to the
informal nature of employment, now compounded by
increasing job instability and insecurity because of the
growing vulnerability of productive enterprises in the
context of globalization (ECLAC, 2004b).
In its evaluation of the need for reforms in the
early 1990s, and in view of rapid population ageing,
ECLAC drew attention to the lack of progress in
expanding coverage and warned of the pressure this
would place on the fiscal accounts once the State took
responsibility for relieving poverty in old age (ECLAC,
1991).9  It also emphasized that countries replacing
their financing mechanisms would have to cope with
enormous fiscal transition costs.10
Despite these warnings, reform models focused on
the contributory components,  opting between
alternatives within six broad areas: (i) the importance
of member contributions as a source of financing; (ii) the
link between benefits and individual effort; (iii) the
mechanism for administering financing; (iv) State
involvement in system management; (v) compulsion;
and (vi) the role of the private sector. Table 1
summarizes the options available to reformers and the
alternatives adopted in two extreme models: Chile’s,
centred on the construction of a contributory individual
capitalization pillar, and New Zealand’s, centred on
the construction of a non-contributory pillar with
universal citizen entitlements.
TABLE 1
Chile and New Zealand: Reform options and extreme alternatives
System design Options adopted in the design Options adopted in the design
options available of the Chilean model of the New Zealand model
Contributory Yes No
Benefits Defined contributions Defined benefits
Financial administration Individually funded Unfunded
Management Private Public
Compulsion Employees Citizen right
Role of the State Market regulation Promotion of voluntary private-sector saving
Market supervision
Distribution
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of St. John and Willmore (2001).
8 Originally, social insurance systems were based on compulsory
contributions from employers and workers and a regulatory
role for the State. Following the creation of the International
Labour Organization in 1919, this type of insurance was
established as a fundamental protection instrument for workers
and their families, but was applied only to certain categories of
workers. The concept was then extended in the United States
(1935) and New Zealand (1938) to include elements of
protection for the excluded and combat poverty, and the term
“social security” began to be employed. This modernized
concept was the one used by Beveridge between 1942 and
1946 as an instrument to combat poverty in Great Britain, so
that contributory social insurance, social assistance for the poor
and excluded and supplementary forms of voluntary insurance
all came to form part of social security. These concepts and
definitions have been enshrined in a variety of declarations on
international social security law (Mesa-Lago, 2004).
9 Also highlighted at that time were institutional weaknesses
affecting the implementation of saving systems, owing to the
fragility of macroeconomic regimes and shortcomings in
regulation, oversight and development both in the pension
fund industry and in capital and insurance markets (Held, 1994;
ECLAC, 1996, chapter 10). Early warning was given of the lack
of organizational regulation and public policies to prevent the
formation of financial conglomerates in the pension fund
management market and to turn financial saving into real
investment (Arrau, 1994 and 1996; Larraín, 1996).
10 See Holzmann (1997), ECLAC (1998) and Bravo and Uthoff
(1999). Different interpretations and implications of these
evaluations can be found in Uthoff (1995), ECLAC (2000,
chapter 4), Jiménez and Cuadros (2003), Mesa-Lago (2004)
and Titelman and Uthoff (2005).
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A number of elements should be taken into account
before one or other of the extreme options is adopted.
Two of them are crucial to the economics of the process.
First, if an individual capitalization pillar prevails, the
system will suffer from a lack of solidarity among
members, since contributions are individually-owned
saving instalments used exclusively to calculate the
benefits of the member concerned. Second, when an
unfunded financing mechanism is replaced by the new
method of capitalization in individual accounts, the
transition costs can be huge. The new system will have
to pay for the benefits of retired members, the benefits
accruing to current members because of rights acquired
in the old system, and benefits explicitly guaranteed
by the system, such as pensions for the armed forces,
minimum pensions and welfare pensions. With the old
system run on an unfunded, graded average premium
basis, its reserve funds can be used to meet this
expenditure if the social agreement under which the
transition takes place so permits.
High transition costs and the loss of solidarity are
consequences of the choices made with the Chilean
model. An earlier study estimated the present value of
the deficits the State would have to incur to cover these
costs in a scenario where different countries opted for
a Chilean-style reform (Bravo and Uthoff, 1999). For a
number of countries this value was in excess of 200%
of GDP, which was why they held back from a reform of
this nature and opted for other models that will be
discussed further on. In the Chilean case, indeed, it is
now universally recognized that the reform has cost
the government more than 5.5% of GDP a year for a
period of 25 years and that it will take several years yet
to pay for all the transition costs, guarantees and
accumulated deficits (figures 16 and 17).
Nor is the option of establishing a universal
citizen’s pension beyond the financial requirements
of the State. Following St. John and Willmore (2001),
it is possible to distinguish two variables determining
the amount of this type of pension as a percentage of
GDP: the first is the number of beneficiaries as a
percentage of the total population, and the second is








































































































Latin America and Haiti: Implicit pension debt
(Percentages of GDP)
Source: Bravo and Uthoff (1999, p. 88).
Source: Arenas de Mesa (2000).
a Bonos de reconocimiento : Certificates entitling members of the old system to transfer entitlements to the new one.
FIGURE 17
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country’s per capita GDP . The result is extremely
sensitive to this latter variable, which means that the
amount of the universal benefit and its source of
financing (income or consumption taxes) will be crucial
issues in the public finance debate. In any event, a
social agreement will be needed.
2. The types of reform adopted
A number of countries in Latin America opted to reform
their contributory systems: they created a stronger link
between contributory efforts and benefits for each
individual; introduced individual capitalization as a
financing criterion, wholly or in part; and allowed
pension funds to be managed privately. These are
known as structural reforms, and the following should
be distinguished: (i) those that, like Chile’s, completely
replace the old pay-as-you-go public-sector system
with an individual capitalization system, in so-called
substitution models (Chile, Bolivia, El Salvador,
Mexico,1 1  Dominican Republic); (ii) those that
supplement the unfunded public system with an
individual account capitalization component, in so-
called mixed models (Argentina, Ecuador, Uruguay,
Costa Rica); and (iii) those that allow members to
choose between the two, in so-called parallel models
(table 2). Of the parametric reforms, attention should
be drawn to Brazil’s reform of the General Social
Security Regime (Regime Geral de Previdência Social
(RGPS)); this reform establishes a capitalization rule
that turns the unfunded system into a defined-
TABLE 2
Latin America: Pension reform models and their characteristics, 2004
Model, country and System Contributions Benefits Financial Management





Mexico: September 1997 Private Defined Undefined FICa Privateb
El Salvador: May 1998
Dominican R.: 2003-2006
Parallel model
Peru: June 1993 Public or Undefined Defined Unfunded Public
Colombia: April 1994 private Defined Undefined FIC Private
Mixed model
Argentina: July 1994
Uruguay: April 1996 Public and Undefined Defined Unfunded Public
Costa Rica: May 2001 private Defined Undefined FIC Multiplec
Ecuador: 2004
With parametric reforms, or none
Brazil (private Regime Geral Public Defined Undefined Unfunded or CPCb Public









Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)d
Source: Mesa-Lago (2004).
a Full individual capitalization (FIC). c Private, public or mixed.
b Collective partial capitalization (CPC). d Parametric reforms recently introduced or in progress.
11 With the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS).
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contribution system (Pinheiro and Paiva, 2000) with
automatic parameter adjustments.
Evaluations of structural reforms are highly
controversial. Some show these reforms as having
positive effects on the economy (Corbo and Schmidt-
Hebbel, 2003) and are used to promote their virtues.
From the social protection point of view, however,
evaluation results leave a good deal to be desired.
Crucially, the coverage of contributory systems is still
low and remains sensitive to the labour market,12  not
only in private systems but also in systems that combine
active contributors (to funded and unfunded schemes).
The coverage of the social protection system stands at
half the economically active population in Argentina,
and in the region as a whole the weighted average has
fallen from 38% to 27%.13  In some countries that kept
their public systems (Brazil and Panama), coverage has
been between twice and four times as high as in seven
countries that carried out structural reform.
Given the importance of formal paid work for
expanding coverage, it is possible to group the
countries by their welfare State gap.14  The percentage
of older adults stating that they have retirement income
in household surveys varies significantly between
these groups of countries (figure 18).15  Inertia is
observed in insurance coverage, since in countries
where the proportion of the older adult population
currently covered is low, so too is the proportion of
wage earners currently paying towards their future
pension (table 2). Unless substantial changes are made
to current systems (to improve coverage), the problem
of old-age poverty will remain.16
It should come as no surprise, then, that even the
World Bank, long a fervent promoter of neoliberal
12 It has been recognized, even by the World Bank, that
extending coverage (especially among informal workers) by
creating greater incentives for participation with the creation
of a close link between contributions and pension amounts
achieved a modest initial increase in two countries (Chile and
Mexico), after which coverage stagnated at half the workforce
in the richer countries and at an even lower level in the rest.
13 The comparison is not perfect for all countries (Mesa-Lago,
2004), but there are two standardized series from Chile that
confirm the downward trend: from 79% in 1973 and 62% in
1975 to 58% in 2002 (Arenas de Mesa and Guzmán, 2003).
14 While this indicator ascribes the same weight to each group of
employees and assumes that every formal worker is fully employed,
it does nonetheless show the difficulties society faces in meeting
the needs of a large percentage of the population that does not
participate in the labour market in a fully productive way.
15 For formal workers to have more dependents does not
necessarily mean that these dependents are needier and/or more
vulnerable, given the multiplicity of family and institutional
arrangements that exist to meet their needs and protect them
from the risks they face. In those societies where demographic
pressures are greater and the formal economy represented by
their workers is limited, however, both the contributory capacity
of the latter and the tax take available to the State for financing
social spending are restricted.
16 The measure of coverage for current workers overestimates
the degree of protection that families will have, since it only
refers to wage earners. The coverage problem is thus even
more serious from the point of view of contributions, which
means  there  i s  scope  for  non-contr ibutory  pens ions
(Fajnzylber, 2005).
FIGURE 18
Latin America: Percentage of older adults receiving retirement income,
by age and country group
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reforms to increase coverage, and indeed of pension
reforms that promote individual saving, should have
recognized in two reports17  that reforms concentrating
exclusively on contributory subsystems will leave
many citizens excluded and in poverty once they reach
old age. Accordingly, one of these reports calls for the
establishment of a tax-financed social protection
network for old age, while the other calls for the
construction of optional schemes to support families
and the excluded.
In countries like Panama and Uruguay, whose social
security systems go back a long way and have high
coverage, there are informal-sector wage earners18  who
are excluded from contributory systems, something that
ultimately represents a burden for the treasury and/or
their families, since such people will look to
government-guaranteed benefits or depend on their
families to survive once faced with poverty in old age.
The percentage contributing is greater in urban areas
than rural ones and several times higher in high-income
sectors than low-income ones. Coverage is below 10%
in the poorest quintiles of the group of countries with
the lowest incomes and the largest number of dependents
per formal worker. The higher per capita income is, the
greater coverage will be in the poorest quintiles of the
country concerned (figure 19).19
17 Gill, Packard and Yermo (2004); Holzmann, Hinz and others (2005).
18 In smaller companies with a low capital/labour ratio and
severe restrictions on access to credit and trade markets.
19 More specific surveys (such as CASEN Chile) reveal that coverage
among the working active population discriminates by income
stratum, sex and occupational category. Women are particularly
unprotected (except insofar as they are treated as beneficiaries of
their husbands’ pensions), as are the unemployed, informal sector
workers and the poorest. In highly unequal societies, contributory
systems that lack a solidarity component will leave out all those
who cannot save to finance their own pensions.
FIGURE 19
Latin America: Working urban residents paying into social security,
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The empirical literature on contribution density
over the active life span concludes that, even among
some of the countries with the highest pension coverage
such as Uruguay, Argentina and Chile, membership
density is far from sufficient to provide any real prospect
of significant replacement rates for the covered
population.20  In both Argentina and Chile, average
contribution density is close to 50%. The Uruguayan
methodological study that is most comparable with
the studies on Argentina and Chile shows that density
is slightly higher in Uruguay (60%) than in the other
two cases; nonetheless, it is well below the 88%
required for a “standard pension” (“jubilación común”)
at 60, or even the 78% needed to retire with a pension
at 65 (Bucheli, Forteza and Ferreira-Coimbra, 2005).
Given these important characteristics of system
coverage, efficiency and equity, five main conclusions
can be reached: (i) transition costs can ultimately be high,
and this factor is so important that it has influenced the
design of the reformed systems; (ii) the considerations of
ethics and the principles of universality, integrality and
solidarity that have to be taken into account in pension
system design are diverse and very profound, and a wide
consensus needs to be reached on these matters; (iii) all
kinds of actors are affected by reforms, and there will be
winners and losers among them, so they need to be
consulted on each of the changes; (iv) privatization of
system management involves major economic and
financial interests, as well as changes in the social security
management power structure, which means that technical
arguments concerning competitiveness and efficiency
need to be studied closely.
Lastly, there is a need to moderate the influence of
international institutions in promoting a particular
class of reforms, chiefly in order to restore solidarity
elements. In particular, it is necessary to restore the
role of the State in the regulation of the pension fund
market and in the distributive aspects of the system.
When individual account capitalization pillars are
promoted, the principle of equivalence applied to each
individual member turns member payments into private
contributions to a defined-contribution individual
saving account, thus depriving the system of any
possibility of internal solidarity. In the absence of
regulation in the individual saving accounts
management market, the equivalence principle crowds
out the solidarity principle. Were the latter applied,
benefits for the poorest, the old and the sick could be
financed out of the contributions of the better-off, the
young and the healthy. By authorizing private
management of pension funds in the way described,
the State takes upon itself a fundamental responsibility
for looking after the poor in old age, but without being
able to use social insurance contributions to fund
pensions. Specifically, the distributive function is
separated from the (private-sector) management of
social pension insurance, and the financing of each of
these areas is separated as well.
20 Fajnzylber (2005) reviews studies of the issue dealing with
Argentina, Uruguay and Chile.
V
The main results
The region’s experience with pension system reforms has
yielded three principal results. First, the shift from
unfunded systems to capitalization systems is no
guarantee of greater physical capital accumulation; on
the contrary, it generates major public saving
requirements that have to be met. Second, the reforms are
not generating enough incentives to increase population
coverage; on the contrary, the structural factors limiting
the contributory coverage of systems have loomed larger.
Third, there is no magic formula for improving benefits:
this can only be achieved if people save more and receive
benefits for shorter periods, and this is linked to the
efficiency with which savings are managed and the way
benefits are adjusted to changes in life expectancy.
1. Greater physical capital accumulation?
In countries that created an individual capitalization pillar,
physical capital has not increased in proportion to workers’
contributions to their individual accounts. Crucially,
workers’ contributions are financial savings and need to
be channelled into real investments, something that does
not happen immediately but depends on the structure of
the portfolio. Unless appropriate macroeconomic
frameworks for long-term resource allocation have been
established and there are structurally regulated and
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supervised institutions to ensure the proper working of
the capital market, most portfolios will be composed of
government bonds and bank deposits. A natural
counterpart to the creation of individual accounts is the
formation of a liability for transition costs in the form of
current pensions, rights acquired by active members and
the liabilities represented by guarantees.
These two tendencies place countries under
serious constraints when it comes to turning pension
saving into physical and non-financial capital
accumulation. Given the high costs of transition, many
countries chose not to replace the unfunded system in
its entirety, and the percentage going to individual
accounts is still low, so that the accumulated fund
remains small as a percentage of GDP. Because of these
same transition costs and long-standing deficits in both
the public finances and, often, the pension system itself,
in many countries the demand for funds by the State
displaces private-sector demand for those same
resources, the result being a high proportion of treasury
bonds in the composition of portfolios.
In summary, the creation of individual account
capitalization pillars generates a fiscal liability for the
pension debt with which the old unfunded system
operated, and likewise for benefits guaranteed to the
armed forces and the poor in old age. The need to accept
responsibility for current pensions, rights acquired
under the old system by current contributors and
benefits guaranteed to the armed forces and the poor
(if there are constitutional guarantees) will demand an
extraordinary commitment of government resources.
If the government is unable to generate a primary
surplus to meet this expenditure, it will end up by
seeking resources from the very capital market it hopes
to bring into being to fund long-term investment
spending through capitalization (figures 20 and 21).
FIGURE 21
Latin America (10 countries): Pension fund composition, June 2005
(Percentages)
Source: International Association of Pension Funds’ Supervisory Organisations (AIOS, 2005).
Government Financial institutions Non-financial institutions
Shares Mutual and investment funds Foreign issuers Other
Argentina Bolivia Chile Colombia Costa Rica El Salvador Mexico Peru UruguayDominican R.
Source: International Association of Pension Funds’ Supervisory Organisations (AIOS, 2005).
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2. Greater coverage?
Another worrying feature of the statistics on reformed
systems is that they reveal a chronic gap between the
number of system members and the number of
contributors (figure 22). Effective coverage as measured
by the proportion of working people actually paying
into these systems remains low, and the existence of a
wide gap between the numbers who have joined them
at some point and the numbers paying in indicates that
the density or regularity of system contributions is
intermittent, and thus that the continuity of saving is
irregular. All this may mean that the capital accrued
by retirement is small, with major implications for
benefit amounts, especially for those on low incomes
and those who do not manage to contribute at an early
age, so that capitalization does not work in their favour.
Faced with this evidence, a number of countries have
initiated panel studies to examine the work and
contribution record of members with a view to determining
what replacement rate they will attain and whether they
will be able to finance their own pensions or will qualify
for State-guaranteed minimum and/or welfare pensions.
According to administrative data from different
pension systems in Latin America, average contribution
density is between 50% and 70%. The average density
of contributions during the working stage of life is
several percentage points higher among men than
among women. Densities are significantly greater in
higher-income sectors (except between the ages of 18
and 25, when many people are studying) than among
lower-income groups. There is a tendency, particularly
in the lowest stratum, for there to be a relatively low
contribution density at the age of 21 but for the
frequency of contributions then to increase gradually
over the course of people’s working lives (table 3).
All this suggests that systems which create closer
links between contributions and replacement rates will
tend to reproduce the inequities of working life, turning
them into pension inequities without leaving any scope
for compensatory subsidies between contributors
within the system (ECLAC, 2002). The least protected
groups (and women in particular) will receive
dramatically lower pensions owing to the low relative
density of their contributions and, in the case of the
lowest quintiles, to the tendency to delay contributing
until a later stage in working life. The density of
contributions varies greatly between men and
women,21  and this is the determining factor in women’s
long contribution gaps, attributable to the amount of
21 In the bottom three quintiles of the female income distribution
(the lowest-income 60%), women have average densities of
less than 40% throughout almost the whole of their lives, while
even men in the second quintile have average densities that are
systematically higher than this.
FIGURE 22
Latin America (10 countries): Pension system coverage, June 2005
(Thousands of members and contributors as a percentage of the economically
active population)
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time taken up by childcare, personal responsibilities,
pregnancy or housework 22  (Marco, 2004; Reyes,
2004). This situation is very far removed from the
contribution density requirements of the systems
operating in the region (table 4).
3. Better pensions?
Moves towards defined contributions must meet three
requirements if good pensions are to be ensured: (i) a
high density of contributions, which, as the last section
showed, is far from being the case; (ii) high returns for
pension funds; and (iii) low administration costs.
Pension fund returns are subject to financial risks
inherent in capital markets. Systems have been
promoted on the basis of historical returns data for the
Chilean model, which are in excess of 20% for those
who have contributed throughout the 25 years of these
funds’ existence. Rates have been highly volatile,
however, with different levels of return for members
who have been in the system at different periods. In
other cases, moreover, it has proved impossible to
insulate them from political risks, such as the systemic
crisis caused by the abandonment of the Convertibility
Act in Argentina (figure 23).
The fact is that the combination of different
contribution periods with different levels of
profitability can result in a low return for a member
over the whole of his or her period of active membership.
In combination with high commissions and a low
contribution density, this can translate into an
explosive situation for the financing of minimum and
welfare pension guarantees if a large majority of
members do not have the funds to finance their
pensions. This possibility has been studied by the
pension funds supervisor (Superintendencia de
Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (SAFP)) in
Chile.
Brazil’s experience shows how important pension
income can be in reducing the incidence of poverty as
determined by market incomes among older adults.
The country has a non-contributory pension
programme with wide coverage in rural areas, and this
has resulted in a sharp reduction in the incidence of
poverty from the age of 60 onward. It can thus be seen
that important distributive instruments are available
22 While this may be directly associated with a recognized
phenomenon, the relatively low labour market participation of
women in Chile, it needs to be considered in the debate about
mechanisms for expanding coverage. Women are contributing
significantly to a country’s development by carrying out the
activities referred to, even if these are not subject to formal
contracts with pay and pension coverage.
TABLE 3
Argentina, Uruguay and Chile: How contributions are distributed
Country Study Sample Average
density (%)
Argentina Bertranou and Sánchez (2003) Employees, private sector, age 25-65, 49
with at least one contribution between
1994 and 2001
Administrative data
Uruguay Lagomarsino and Lanzilotta (2004) Private-sector employees with at least one 70.2
contribution during the second half of 1996, 69.7 (M)
contribution density between 1997 and 2003 70.9 (W)
Administrative data
Bucheli, Forteza and Contributors to the Banco de Previsión Social (BPS) 60.8
Ferreira-Coimbra (2005) with at least one contribution between 1996 and 2004 62.9 (M)
Administrative data 58.5 (W)
Chile Arenas de Mesa, Members of the AFP system with at least one 52.4
Behrman and Bravo (2004) contribution between 1980 and 2001 59.8 (M)
Information provided in the Social Panorama survey 41.4 (W)
Benstein, Larraín and Pino (2005) Members of the AFP system with at least one 53
contribution between 1980 and 2001 59 (M)
Administrative data 41 (W)
Source: The authors cited in the table.
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for social pensions, but these require highly complex
agreements (figure 24). In the case of non-contributory
pensions, there are transfers in the form of subsidies
from general taxation and, in certain cases, solidarity
transfers of contributions to older adults. In the case of
contributory pensions, there are transfers of savings to
older adults from younger groups, whether these are
contemporaries (unfunded system) or the actual member
at an earlier stage in his or her life cycle (capitalization
system).
A basic dilemma for pension systems are the
complex relations between contributory and non-
TABLE 4
Latin America: Minimum densities required in public pension systemsa
Country Retirement option Minimum Minimum years Minimum density at Minimum
retirement age contributions retirement age (%) density (%)
Women Men Women Men Women Men Age 20-65
Chile Maximum replacement rate 60 65 20 20 50 44 44
Bolivia  50 55 15 15 50 43 33
Mexico  65 65 9.5 9.5 21 21 21
El Salvador  55 60 25 25 71 63 56
Dominican R. Contributory 60 60 30 30 75 75 67
 Subsidized contributory 60 60 25 25 63 63 56
Nicaragua  60 65 - - - - -
Peru  65 65 20 20 44 44 44
Colombia  55 60 20 20 57 50 44
Argentina  60 65 30 30 75 67 67
Uruguay Standard retirement 60 60 35 35 88 88 78
Advanced-age retirement 70 70 15 15 30 30 33
Old-age pension
(non-contributory) 70 70 - - - - -
Costa Rica Normal 65 65 20 20 44 44 44
 Early 59.9 61.9 38 39 95 93 86
Ecuador Option 1 60 60 30 30 75 75 67
 Option 2 65 65 10 10 22 22 22
 Option 3 70 70 15 15 30 30 33
Brazil  60 65 15 15 38 33 33
Cuba  55 60 25b 25b 71 63 56
Guatemala  60 60 15 15 3 38 33
Honduras  60 65 15 15 38 33 33
Panama  57 62 15 15 41 36 33
Paraguay Option 1 60 60 25 25 63 63 56
 Option 2 55 55 30 30 86 86 67
Venezuela
(Bol. Rep. of)  55 60 14.5 14.5 41 36 32
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of Mesa-Lago (2004, tables 4 and 15).
a The table follows the order of presentation used by Mesa-Lago. First come the six substitution reform countries (Chile, Bolivia,
Mexico, El Salvador, Dominican Republic and Nicaragua), followed by the two countries that adopted parallel schemes (Peru and
Colombia), the four countries with mixed pillars (Argentina, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Ecuador) and seven countries with
parametric reforms or none as of 2004.
b The requirement in Cuba is years worked.
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contributory financing mechanisms. Both perform the
functions required for a pension system, only benefits
may be non-contributory or be linked to individual
contribution efforts. It is possible that the certainty of
receiving non-contributory benefits may reduce efforts
to contribute to the system, in a kind of substitution
effect, and thus generate perverse incentives for
membership.
Although pension benefits can be very helpful in
reducing the incidence of poverty among older adults,
the distributive component has to be designed to
complement the contributory component. Extreme
cases do exist, like the New Zealand model, where all
benefits are non-contributory and universal and there
is a private-sector system of supplementary saving. At
the other end of the scale is the Chilean model, which
is contributory and involves capital ization in
individual saving accounts managed by the private
sector, with the State playing only a distributive role.
The potential for extending coverage via
distributive policies that is held out by guaranteed
welfare pensions needs to be handled very carefully, so
that the incentive structure of the contributory
component is not affected by the distributive role of the
State, inside or outside the system. However, a lack of
policies to guarantee stable employment will mean that
contributory systems increasingly serve to select
members by saving capacity and separate them into fully
FIGURE 23
Latin America (10 countries): Real gross pension fund returns, June 2005
Source: International Association of Pension Funds’ Supervisory Organisations (AIOS, 2005).
a Returns in Chile are for Fund C.
b Historical returns correspond to the last 120 months.
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FIGURE 24
Brazil: The distributive role of
social security, 1999
(Poverty by age)
Source: National household survey (PNAD) for 1999, Institute
of Applied Economic Research (IPEA)/Ministry of Welfare and
Social Assistance.
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insured, underinsured and uninsured. For these last two
categories of members, as the case of Chile shows, there
will be increasing demands for explicit guarantees, in
the form either of welfare pensions or of subsidized
insurance for those who, having made an effort to
contribute, fail to attain a “decent” pension (figure 25).
The Chilean model guarantees a minimum benefit
level for all those who have paid into the system for 240
months and are unable to finance the value of that benefit
once they reach retirement age. For everyone else,
however, there is no guarantee even of a welfare pension,
as these are subject to quotas set in the national budget
and granted in accordance with strict targeting criteria.
Projections for Chilean defined-contribution
systems show that, given reasonable assumptions for
growth in per capita GDP, wages and pension fund returns,
members who reach retirement age will be eligible for
State-guaranteed minimum pensions whether or not they
are poor. A larger and larger proportion will receive a
State-guaranteed minimum pension. In this way, a
system that reforms the contributory component will
only benefit less than half of all workers, leaving a
growing distributive burden to be borne by the State.
According to estimates by the Chilean Ministry of
Finance, this will mean enormous contingent liabilities
(Arenas de Mesa, Llanes and Miranda, 2005).
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FIGURE 25
Chile: Projections of different pension types for members of the AFP systema
Source: Bernstein and Ruiz (2005).
a Pensions below the minimum pension (MP), with or without a State guarantee (SG), grow by 2%, wages by 2% and returns by 5%.
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The pensions issue involves complex interactions, and
very substantive political and social agreements will
be needed to resolve them. In particular, the rights
agenda needs to be reconciled with the public finance
agenda so that  the pension system designed
(i) promotes pension saving and (ii) provides the poor
with decent old-age pensions. In addition to these two
objectives, hard enough to achieve as it is, any new
design is now expected to contribute to others as well:
(iii) keeping the public finances solvent; (iv) generating
financial saving to develop the capital market; and
(v) contributing to competitiveness.
To rank and harmonize these objectives, there
needs to be a very wide-ranging political agreement
that allows five major strategies to be reconciled. First,
at the macroeconomic and institutional level, a strategy
to protect the growth and investment capacity of the
economy in a context of nominal and real stability.
This means that the social agreement needs to recognize
the importance of a macroeconomic and institutional
pillar whereby countercyclical policies are
implemented through structural surplus rules and/or
stabilization funds, financial and pension fund markets
are strictly regulated and monitored, and clear rules
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are laid down for monetary, currency and international
reserves management, in order to give credibility to
the real exchange rate and interest rate.
Second, a strategy for permanently reconciling
(which also means adapting) the pension system to the
structures and dynamics of the population, the labour
market and the public finances. There is no one pension
system that is right for different countries, or for any
given country over time. The model needs to be
continually adapting to changes in demographic
structures, families, the labour market and the public
finances, and must always include criteria of
universality and solidarity so that, with minimum but
socially accepted benefits, its financing and form of
administration do not leave people underinsured or
uninsured.
Third, a strategy for strengthening the contribution
base over the long term, since as well as improving the
economic and financial underpinnings of growth
(macroeconomic pillar), there is also a need to improve
the productive capacity of members. This strategy
recognizes two further pillars: one of human capital
formation through education and workforce training,
and one of productive development and employment,
designed to take advantage of the country’s niches
and potential and to stimulate the needful research and
development.
Fourth, a strategy that includes both solidarity
saving mechanisms to finance benefits (with special
emphasis on rewarding saving efforts through defined-
contribution systems) and actuarially determined
guarantee funds for the provision of minimum benefits.
The challenge is to regulate the way benefits are
financed so that the principles of equivalence and
solidarity are reconciled. The essential thing in each
social contract is that benefits should not exceed duly
capitalized contributions. These principles clash when
equivalence is practised in individual contracts without
any provision for cross-subsidies in the interests of
solidarity (figure 26).
What ECLAC proposes is to give social content to
the fiscal covenant by creating a social agreement that
orients it, and to do this by means of five pillars, the
fifth being participatory democracy (table 5). This last
pillar promotes civic participation in the fundamental
decisions that a society needs to take, particularly as
regards improvements to the immediate and long-term
coverage and benefits of pension systems. These
systems, therefore, need to be flexible enough to adapt
to the different stages in a society’s development, and
in each case decisions will be required as to how much
of the system’s funds can be put into financial
instruments, given the financial constraints of the
society concerned and the way these manifest
themselves in the heterogeneous world constituted by
different types of families, production units and
employment opportunities.
For coverage to be extended, considering the gaps
in the welfare State, financing sources and
administration mechanisms need to be highly specific.
Unquestionably, however, the trio of market, family
and State cannot provide universal cover until there is
a social agreement dealing with (i) explicit minimum
benefit guarantees, (ii) solidarity financing sources and
(iii) the prerequisites for benefit entitlement. The speed
at which the Latin American population is ageing, the
effect that the constant adaptation of the production
apparatus to new conditions of competitiveness has
been having on employment, and the various ways in
which society has been reacting to survive under these
conditions, have made social protection in the area of
pensions a core challenge, the responses to which must
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